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A MULTIRACIAL REPUBLIC? THE 
CHALLENGES FACED BY THE MAGHREB 
POPULATION IN FRANCE
ANAHITA VASUDEVAN, KEVIN RATANA PATUMWAT, AND 
KEVIN FULGHAM
University of California, Berkeley
Abstract
As European society becomes more multiethnic and multiracial, Member States of the 
European Union are faced with the need to formulate adequate policy responses to immi-
gration and integration issues. France has had a distinctive history, lasting over five decades, 
as a recipient country for non-European immigrants from the Maghreb region of Northern 
Africa. Over time, discrepancies in living conditions between Maghreb immigrants and the 
wider French society have only deepened. To investigate the current state of the Maghreb 
community in France, this analytical paper pursues the following questions: How does the 
persistence of political, economic, and social differences affect the position of Maghreb 
immigrants in French society? What efforts are being made by the French government to 
minimize disparities between the Maghreb population and the wider society? What is the 
relationship between the French model of integration and the policies of other EU states on 
immigrant integration?
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Part I: Introduction 
French Colonial Ties to Maghreb Region
      France has a history of interactions and political ties with the Maghreb region of 
Northern Africa, which consists of countries such as Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco, that 
began during the colonial period. As a strong colonizing power during the 1830s, the 
French landed in Algeria with the idea of collective colonization and cooperation from 
Algerians in order to modernize and “Westernize” the African nation (Balch, 1909). The 
French, faced with tension from the Prussian and German states, sought to enter Algeria 
and augment the French-speaking population in order to make up for the decreasing 
growth rate of native French-speaking people (Balch, 1909). Subsequently, generations of 
Algerians under French rule grew up surrounded by French laws, language, and culture 
(Balch, 1909). The French continued to hold colonial rule in Tunisia and Morocco until 
1956, and Algeria gained independence from France in 1962 (“France Timeline,” 2012). 
Definitions of Migrant and Integration
       According to the International Organization for Migration’s “Glossary of Migration,” 
a “migrant” can be defined as a person who moves from one place to another, often across 
countries, to improve their living conditions and future prospects (Perruchoud, 2004). The 
process by which immigrants become accustomed and accepted into the host society is 
known as “integration” (Perruchoud, 2004). Due to Maghreb immigration, France became 
a multiethnic state, and the roles of immigration and integration became increasingly 
important in forming the social identity of immigrants and successive generations.
Immigration and Integration into France (1960s-1990s)
       In the Post-World War II period, the French government took measures to repatriate 
immigrants. However, by the 1950s, the low immigrant population forced the French gov-
ernment to recruit more immigrants to expand the workforce (McNeil, 1998). Although 
the French government originally preferred to allow European immigrants across the border 
to work in France, a larger interest came from the population of France’s former colonies, 
which still proved to be “culturally compatible” (McNeil, 1998). Between 1946 and 1975, 
France’s immigrant population doubled, reaching 3.4 million people, the largest group 
of which was from Algeria (McNeil, 1998). Most migrants were single men who arrived 
in France predominantly for work, but by the 1970s, women and children journeyed to 
France to reunify their families (McNeil, 1998). However, in 1974, France ended inward 
immigration (McNeil, 1998). Finally, following René Giraud’s theory of the “threshold 
of tolerance”—which holds that there was a point at which a minority group’s population 
would become high enough to cross the threshold and increase conflict between ethnic 
groups—Maghreb immigrants in France were treated with hostility because of their self-
sufficient and entrepreneurial nature in comparison to other immigrant groups (McNeil, 
1998). Thus, immigrants were relegated to the suburbs of major cities in France to live 
in low-income group housing that, over time, became more permanent settlements and 
widened the discrepancies in living standards between immigrants and the rest of France.  
Riots and Current Events (2005-present)
       In October 2005, the Parisian suburb Clichy-sous-Bois experienced over three weeks 
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of rioting, unrest, and violence by Maghreb immigrants who were protesting discrimina-
tion, racism, and economic bias, bringing to light the sense of disenfranchisement felt 
among these immigrants. The particular incident that sparked these violent riots was the 
death of two young boys who were electrocuted after being chased by police because they 
seemed suspicious (Smith, 2005). As a result, Maghreb immigrant groups held riots to bring 
the high rates of unemployment and marginalization among Maghreb groups to the French 
government’s attention. In general, “though France has a policy of officially ignoring ethnic 
differences in favor of French identity, its people have been slow to open their arms to 
newcomers who are told that they should enjoy the same rights” (Smith, 2005). Protests 
against these indirect—yet prevalent—exclusionary practices have manifested, in some 
cases, in extremist Islamic radicals recruited in the suburbs of France (Smith, 2005). Even 
in 2015, the threat of extremist violence among the Maghreb youth population became a 
reality with attacks by the Kouachi brothers (one of whom had outside terrorist links with 
Al Qaeda in Yemen) on the headquarters of the political cartoon magazine, Charlie Hebdo, 
that left twelve people dead (Madi, Ryder, Macfarlane, Beach, & Park, n.d.). 
Part II: Research Question and Thesis 
Research Question, Significance, and Methodology
       The unique situation of Maghreb immigrants in France highlights nuances surrounding 
the research question of integration models in France. Due to significant cultural differences 
between generations of Maghreb immigrants, the children of first generation Maghrebis 
are known as beurs, who have established themselves as a distinctive part of society. Both 
first and second generation Maghrebis from Northern Africa have particular cultural traits, 
including language, religion, and traditional practices, that set them apart from French soci-
ety, making integration even more difficult. These cultural differences of Maghreb immi-
grants coupled with actions of wider French society makes integration more difficult. This 
paper seeks to identify major factors that contribute to this separation as well as examine 
how the role of Maghreb immigrants in French society changes based on these factors. In 
addition, this paper will address the efforts currently being made in response to difficul-
ties in immigrant integration by the French government to minimize disparities among 
immigrant living conditions as well as the effectiveness of those responses. Finally, this 
paper compares the French model of integration with that of Belgium, which has a similar 
immigrant situation, and the policies Belgium has enacted to facilitate Maghreb integration. 
This paper uses government documents, news articles, and historical sources to assess and 
compare integration models in France and Europe, as the global significance of integration 
is increasing due to the spread of radicalization of immigrant youth that could potentially 
be the result of poor integration. 
Objectives and Structure of Thesis
       In analyzing the historical background of Maghreb immigrants in France and the per-
sistence of political, economic, and social challenges faced by Maghreb immigrants while 
integrating into French society, these obstacles create greater instances of marginalization 
and frustration that can manifest in radicalization and violence. In an attempt to mitigate 
the prevalence of extremist immigrants, the French government currently promotes a set 
of policies, at both the national and local levels, that seeks to improve the lives of Maghreb 
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immigrants living in the banlieues, or suburbs, while also minimizing the economic, social, 
and political inequalities that exist between the city and the suburbs. Although these poli-
cies do exist, the French government’s inefficiencies, such as overlapping jurisdictions and 
lack of influence in implementing techniques, makes integration difficult. By comparing 
the French model to other models within the European Union, this paper hopes to both 
recognize similarities and offer more efficient methods to adopt in France.
Part III: Immigrant Integration into French Society 
Political Difficulties
       Immigrants in France face two-fold difficulties when navigating French government 
policies because immigrants are not given ample support from the government and are 
often not given the chance to represent themselves in government bodies. For example, 
current integration policies in France dictate that the jurisdiction of immigration laws can 
last up to five years concerning immigrants in France, meaning that beyond the five-year 
initial settlement in France, immigrants no longer receive consistent government support 
(Escafré-Dublet, 2014). At the same time, Maghrebis in France are often not represented 
at all: In 2007, the National Assembly did not include any Maghrebis among its members, 
although many of the Maghrebis were French nationals (Bloemraad & Shönwälder, 2013). 
In some cases, candidates in France sought to attract an electorate of immigrants and multi-
ethnic groups, but the representatives selected were unconnected to both the electorate and 
targeted ethnic community (Bloemraad & Shönwälder, 2013). Finally, this lack of support 
from the government and immigrants’ under-representation in government affairs leads to 
reduced economic opportunities and social dilemmas for Maghrebis.                    
Economic Exclusion
        Maghreb immigrants originally moved to France to become part of a temporary work-
force, but they have now become a permanent minority population in France. However, 
despite the fact that Maghreb immigrants play an integral role in French society, they have 
faced economic difficulties imposed by the greater French population, forcing them to 
reside in low-income housing projects in the suburbs. Even if Maghreb immigrants try to 
overcome their current economic conditions, according to the Migration Policy Institute, 
the physical exclusion of living in the suburbs makes it more difficult for immigrants to 
find jobs and gain admissions to the top universities in the cities (Escafré-Dublet, 2014). As 
a result, they have to settle for unskilled labor jobs in higher crime neighborhoods, which 
perpetuates their living in the suburbs and continued economic and social marginalization. 
This economic predicament is particularly imposing for young immigrants who were born 
and educated in France and actually face underemployment because they possess skills 
beyond those required for their current jobs and are underrepresented in higher skilled jobs 
(Escafré-Dublet, 2014). Simply put, these young immigrants face discrimination because 
they compete with other French citizens of comparable skill, creating an inescapable and 
frustrating situation.
Socio-cultural Issues
      Maghreb immigrants currently face a dual national identity that is split between 
Maghreb nations and France; there are many socio-cultural issues related to this identity 
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crisis that create difficulties for Maghreb immigrants in educational, religious, and cultural 
aspects. As an immigrant to France who mostly speaks Arabic, the difficulty of gaining lan-
guage education and educational recognition in the form of a French diploma creates work-
place barriers for first generation immigrants (Escafré-Dublet, 2014). As the majority of the 
current Maghreb population is Muslim (a result of the Arab invasion of Northern Africa in 
647 CE that converted the majority of the population from Christianity to Islam) there is 
often a tension between the Islamic population and French republican society (“Maghreb,” 
2014). For example, as recently as 2010, the European Court of Human Rights created a 
ban on the niqab, the Muslim full-face veil, mandating that citizens who breach this law 
would have to undergo instruction on French citizenship (“European Court,” 2014). This 
government response underlines the cultural clash between the immigrants’ own culture 
and the culture of the host country, which reinforces the sense that France considers its 
immigrants outsiders. This niqab ban also indicates a different take on gender roles between 
French and Maghrebi society; for instance, Maghrebis may view the niqab as a symbol of 
privacy and modesty. In comparison, in France, there is general acceptance of women 
taking on more responsibility and independence in both the domestic and professional 
spheres. These issues surrounding the role of women, religion, and education, create divides 
in communities, which makes community building difficult and contributes to a lack of 
civic engagement among immigrants, which then affects their political representation and 
economic opportunities. 
Future Challenges
       France is currently home to the largest Islamic community in Europe, which is com-
prised of approximately five million Muslims (Engler, n.d.). Due to the limitations of the 
French republican ideals of secularism and the French integration model, the occurrences of 
violence from the extreme right have increased since the 1990s (Engler, n.d.). In response 
to these events, the French government instituted the Law of Equal Opportunities in 2005 
to avoid discrimination and enhance youth immigrant integration (Engler, n.d.). However, 
the scope of the Law of Equal of Opportunities is confined to issues regarding social cohe-
sion and fair practices in hiring employees and does not include issues of education and 
community building as precautionary measures against extremism. Regarding the future of 
Maghreb immigrants in France, efforts to ameliorate the French integration model will have 
to concentrate on the sources of marginalization, new demographic trends of diminishing 
French birth rates and large inflows of immigrants, and the establishment of a social system 
that incorporates immigrants as long-term residents of France (Engler, n.d.).         
Part IV: Existing French Government Policies and Responses 
French Republicanism
       France’s traditional national model of integration can be called the “assimilationist” 
model. In some cases, the model is referred to as the “republican” model, as it draws upon 
a set of values which is seen as fundamental to the nature of the French state. In contrast 
to the United States, which recognizes the ethnic diversity of its population (an approach 
known in France as ‘communitarianism’), the French state is religiously and ethnically 
blind. In other words, it does not recognize the relevance of ethnic or religious differ-
ences, treating citizens instead as part of one monolithic, national ‘French’ community. 
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This approach is reflected in the French government’s refusal to collect census data on its 
citizens’ ethnicities, limiting itself to more general indicators such as ‘naturalized citizens’ or 
‘foreign-born’ (Escafré-Dublet, Lelévrier, & Tenfiche, 2014). In addition, there is a strong 
social expectation that all members of French society adopt ‘mainstream’ French values 
and abandon their affiliation with other communities. The idea of distinctive communities 
constituting themselves separately around different identities has long been treated with 
hostility by national politicians, exemplified most prominently by Interior Minister Charles 
Pasqua’s statement made in 1993 distinguishing between a ‘multiethnic’ republic, which 
he considered acceptable, and a ‘multicultural’ republic, which it was not (Dikeç, 2006).
Integration Policy as Urban Policy
      As a result of the French state’s color-blind approach, policies aimed at the Maghreb 
community are frequently framed as urban policies, labeled collectively as Politiques de la 
Ville, which are managed by the Ministry of Urban Affairs (Politique de la ville, 2011). In 
1996, the French government labeled approximately 750 urban areas across the country 
as ZUS (Zones Urbaines Sensibles - Sensitive Urban Zones) (Zone urbaine sensible, n.d.). 
While economically disadvantaged neighborhoods are the nominal target of these poli-
cies, a large number of ZUS areas coincide with the country’s Maghreb-heavy suburban 
neighborhoods. ZUS areas are eligible for a number of special incentives provided by the 
government. For instance, tax and social security contribution exemptions are provided to 
companies that are located in ZUS areas and have a certain number of ZUS residents as 
employees (Politique de la ville, 2011). ZUS areas and other neighborhood-oriented poli-
cies form the backbone of the French government’s socioeconomic policies towards the 
Maghreb community.
Anti-Discrimination Framework
      Amid increasing concern over the expanding socioeconomic disparities between French 
society and its Maghreb community, the late 1990s and early 2000s saw the beginning of 
a shift away from the ethnicity-blind “republican” model and towards an implicit rec-
ognition of diversity through the creation of an “anti-discrimination” policy framework 
(Escafré-Dublet, Lelévrier, and Tenfiche, 2014). Several new government organizations 
were established, including the HALDE (Haute Autorité de lutte contre les discriminations et 
pour l’égalité – High Authority for Equality and Combating Discrimination) and the ACSE 
(Agence nationale pour la cohésion sociale et l’égalité des chances – National Agency for Social 
Cohesion and Equality of Opportunity). HALDE was tasked with providing counseling 
as well as taking legal action on behalf of victims of discrimination, primarily in the areas 
of employment, education, and housing (Escafré-Dublet, 2014). Through the creation 
of HALDE, the workplace has become another focus of government anti-discrimination 
policy. ACSE can be seen as the local-level arm of the French government, providing 
funds to nonprofit organizations operating in designated underprivileged localities in vari-
ous domains, including those overseen by HALDE, but also others such as healthcare and 
access to cultural opportunities (Politique de la Ville, n.d.). While these organizations have 
undoubtedly contributed to the direction of public resources to the integration of the 
Maghreb community, they remain constrained by the deeply ingrained republican civic 
model. Due to the aforementioned norm against the collection of ethnic data, ACSE does 
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not have the statistics that would allow it to estimate its impact in the ethnic communities 
(Escafré-Duble, 2014).
Part V: Case Studies: Paris and Marseille
Paris 
       Policies towards the Maghreb community in the Paris metropolitan area have been 
shaped by local administrative boundaries. Much of Paris’s Maghreb community does not 
live in the city limits of Paris proper, but instead lives in various small suburban municipali-
ties, the banlieues, which are separate from the city. Beyond perpetuating a sense of class and 
race-based exclusion, this structure has posed difficulties for coordination of policy between 
the municipal government of Paris, where many members of the community work, and the 
local governments of the banlieues, in which they reside.
       As a result, attempts have been made by the French government to re-configure 
administrative units in the Paris region to respond to the fact that the city and the ban-
lieues function as a single urban unit. President Nicolas Sarkozy presented the ambitious 
“Grand Paris” project in 2007 (Enright, 2012). The project included sweeping policy 
changes, notably in transportation. Despite the proximity of the banlieues to the center of 
Paris, public transportation options for residents of the banlieues are limited, amplifying a 
sense of isolation from the city. It is not uncommon for residents of the banlieues to have 
never set foot in Paris’s vaunted cultural institutions, located only a few miles from their 
homes (“Forgotten in the Banlieues,” 2013). The “Grand Paris” project aims to reduce 
geographical segregation by constructing several long subway lines, collectively known as 
the “Grand Paris Express.” The new lines will reach into Paris’s periphery far beyond the 
current system, which is heavily Paris-centric, allowing banlieue residents to travel between 
banlieues without having to enter Paris. 
       “Grand Paris” also initially called for the suppression of the banlieue municipalities and 
their absorption into Paris, but this reorganization plan was withdrawn due to resistance 
from the leaders of the suburban municipalities and due to fears that a centralizing approach 
would limit opportunities for bottom-up initiatives in favor of uniform top-down policies 
(Erlanger, 2009). Instead, “Grand Paris” would be constituted as an intercommunalité, a struc-
ture that allows for greater administrative cooperation between different local governments 
while preserving their individual existence.
Marseille
      Marseille is the second largest metropolitan area in France. Approximately one quar-
ter of the city’s population is of North African descent, a result of its proximity to the 
region and its history as a Mediterranean commercial port. Marseille provides an illustrative 
counterpoint to Paris, as it is a relatively successful example of integration of the Maghreb 
community. Notably, the city was virtually untouched by the 2005 urban riots. Marseille’s 
success can be attributed to the fact that, among other reasons, Marseille’s Maghreb com-
munity sees itself as a constructive stakeholder in the city.
       In contrast to Paris, there is no stark division between the city’s center and its periph-
ery. Maghreb residents are not confined to the outskirts of the city, as the city’s central 
neighborhood is also home to a visible community of Maghrebis. Government-built low-
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income housing units in Marseille were not located exclusively on the margins of the city, 
with the units being dispersed across the urban area (Mitchell, 2011). In addition, the city 
center contains multiple urban recreation areas, including beaches, which are widely used 
by Maghreb and non-Maghreb youth alike. The lower degree of geographical segregation 
acts as a tool in promoting social cohesion.
       Furthermore, local officials in Marseille have consistently adopted an approach that 
slightly diverges from the national “republican” model by engaging in dialogue with com-
munity leaders representing Maghreb residents. This framework is represented by the city’s 
Service de relations avec les communautés (Service for Community Relations), a department 
tasked with managing relations between the city and identity-based communities as well 
as relations between the communities themselves (Mitchell, 2011). When it was founded 
in 2001, this department was unique in France. A prominent organization operating under 
this department is Marseille Espérance, which brings together the city’s political officials and 
religious leaders (Mitchell, 2011). The leaders act as a force of unity, acting as mediators in 
community conflict as well as giving statements in favor of tolerance when racial tensions 
flare up nationally or locally. Efforts such as this contribute to assuring Maghreb residents 
that their interests are recognized and respected by the city, and act as a bulwark against 
ethnic segregation that is pervasive in other cities such as Paris.
Part VI: Case Study Comparison with Belgium
Moroccans in Belgium 
       Moroccan populations in Belgium are the most similar to the closest comparison to 
French Maghreb populations as a result of comparative migration history and integration 
issues. Similar to the influx of Maghreb immigrants into France, following Algeria’s de-col-
onization in the 1950s, Belgium experienced an immigration influx through guest-worker 
programs. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, Belgium signed a series of bilateral agree-
ments relaxing the regulations on migrant workers from countries such as Morocco and 
Turkey in 1964. Moroccan immigration has dramatically increased since 1964. Between 
1995-2000, 26% of naturalized Belgian citizens were of Moroccan origin (Wets, 2004). 
However, more than half of the Moroccan population is of Berber descent, a group that 
partially emigrated for political reasons. This is in sharp contrast to the economically moti-
vated migration of French Maghrebis (Alba and Waters, 2011). Furthermore, to the French 
Maghrebis’ predominantly suburban location, Belgium’s Moroccan population is centered 
in the Brussels Metropolitan area (Kesteloot and Cortie, 1998). Due to Belgium’s political 
split between the Flemish and French communities, the Flemish Community Commission 
and the French Community Commission are the first points of contact for migrant integra-
tion (Mandin, 2014). Each Commission has its own integration priorities; however, both 
provide similar services such as adult education, language skills, resettlement, and legal aid 
(Grégoire, 2003). The following section will look at political, economic, and socio-cultural 
integration as key determinants of integration as a whole.
Political Representation
       A key measure of political integration is political representation, as it is a quantifiable 
measure of political integration within the established system. Belgium’s model of politi-
cal integration is a mixture of British multicultural and French assimilationist approaches 
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(Phalet & Swyngedouw, 2002). In the 1980s, this unique model was enshrined in the new 
nationality code, easing citizenship requirements for second-generation Moroccans and 
increasing the economic and political power of Moroccan populations (Lesthaeghe, 2000). 
This reflected the idea that Moroccans could retain their original cultural identity and still 
integrate into Belgian society. Eventually, these laws allowed ethnic enclaves to generate 
their own political representation. Moroccan political representation grew to include up 
to 20% of the city council members in the Greater Brussels area (Jacobs and Swyngedouw, 
2002).
 
Housing
       It is important to understand established housing disparities between the Moroccan 
population and ethnically Belgian population in order to evaluate the effectiveness of 
the government’s economic and employment policies. In Belgium, the majority of the 
Moroccan population is centered in inner-city Brussels (Alba and Waters, 2011). A signifi-
cant segment of this population is second-generation Belgians of Moroccan ancestry. The 
Moroccan population has a lower degree of economic integration and a higher unemploy-
ment rate compared to ethnic Belgians centered in low-income areas surrounding Brussels. 
Brussels and Belgium create housing policies that favor home ownership and single-family 
suburban housing that are affordable to international skilled workers and ethnic Belgians. 
The lack of affordable multi-unit housing forces the migrant Moroccans into the “The 
Pentagon” neighborhood of inner-city Brussels where there are limited economic possibili-
ties (Kesteloot and Cortie, 1998).
Youth Radicalization
       Youth radicalization is a significant European area of concern because the youth 
movement’s failure to integrate could result in social instability. Similar to France, the 
youth form a majority of Belgium’s immigrant population; Moroccans and Turks com-
prise a majority of Belgium’s total youth population (18-25 years). The lack of economic 
opportunity combined with the influx of radical imams has increased the possibility of youth 
radicalization. Belgium, disproportionately, remains a source of international jihadists per 
capita (Kesteloot and Cortie, 1998), (Higgins, 2015). This is attributed, partially due to the 
lack of economic integration, but also to anti-Islamic policies originating in Flanders. The 
era of Islamophobia in Flanders grew in 2012 with the banning of the full-face veil, coin-
ciding with the electoral rise of right-wing party and anti-Islam Vlaams Belang (Jacobs and 
Swyngedouw, 2002). Flanders, as opposed to Wallonia, places more emphasis on integrat-
ing into a homogeneous identity. Brussels tries to combat rising Islamophobia through the 
Center for Equal Opportunity and Fight against Racism (CEOFR), a government agency 
that works to report racism, provide intercultural communication, develop sports leagues, 
and ensure equal opportunity job prospects (Jacobs and Swyngedouw, 2002). The govern-
ment hopes that by providing sports and economic opportunities, youth will be persuaded 
to integrate into Belgian society through cultural, social, and economic socialization, sub-
stituting radical mosques for sports pitches and jobs.
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Education
       Education remains a key component for economic advancement and social integra-
tion in the Moroccan population. Currently, the children of immigrants who arrived in 
the 1960s are entering the educational system; furthermore, this generation has grown up 
in Belgium and has been educated through the Belgian system, creating an effective test 
of Belgian policies. A majority of the first-generation Moroccan population has no formal 
education; in the second generation, 39% of the Moroccan male population had attained 
secondary education (Lesthaeghe, 2000). This is significantly higher than other ethnic 
immigrant populations. However, the population without any formal education is also 
higher in the Moroccan population. The strong disparities in educational attainment result 
from various economic developments, poor education facilities, and the cultural importance 
of education.
Part VII: Supranational EU Policies and The French Model 
Overview of EU Policies
       From French assimilation, British multiculturalism, nativist, and international ideolo-
gies, the European Union’s policy on integration reflects the diverse interests of the EU 
member states. Issues of assimilation, migrants from outside the EU, and integration remain 
critical and contentious policy issues that underwent significant changes in 2004 and 2011. 
       In 2004, the European Commission proposed that each EU Member State should 
have its own integration policy supported by a set of common EU principles (Lesthaeghe, 
2000). In 2011, the European Commission’s Directorate General on Migration and Home 
Affairs proposed the “European agenda for the integration of non-EU migrants,” a compre-
hensive guide underlining common EU integration program funding policies and EU social 
policies (European Commision, 2011b). This proposed set of policies was non-binding 
but connected to several European Commission funds. In 2011, the European Union set 
down the European Agenda, which reaffirmed integration would be primarily handled on 
a local and regional level, while the EU would deal with supranational policies designed 
to reduce systemic poverty (European Commission, 2011b).  The EU would accomplish 
this through the European Union Integration Fund, totaling 825 million euros from 2009-
2013, providing member states with initial capital for integration projects and poverty 
alleviation (Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion, 2015b). The 
Directorate Generals on Migration and Home Affairs’ policy recommendations argued that 
integration was a EU priority because of the expanding scope of the EU and the impact 
of market integration on EU member states. The EU’s support for integration was further 
emphasized in the Stockholm Programme of 2009, a comprehensive evaluation of EU 
human rights laws, and the Europe 2020, the EU’s economic growth strategy for the next 
decade (European Council, 2010).
Examples of EU Policy
       In contrast to the EU’s policy of delegating integration to local levels, some examples of 
supranational EU initiatives on housing, education, and cultural integration policies include 
several European Funds and educational attainment funds. 
       The European Commission (EC) acknowledges that it is common for migrants outside 
of the EU to migrate between EU member states, seeking economic opportunity. For this 
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reason, the EC recommends housing integration at the local level to assist the new popu-
lations. However, on the EU level, the European Commission provides funding through 
the European Social Fund (2014-2020) to stimulate growth and integrate services for new 
third country nationals (Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion, 
2015). This fund wants to integrate third country nationals into the EU economy, as per 
Europe 2020.
       Another directive in the European Commission Working Paper of 2011 is access to 
education (European Commission, 2011b). The EC predicts that by age 15, third-country 
national children are already 1.5 years behind in education (Lesthaeghe, 2000). The 
European Commission has identified language skills as a primary factor that is impeding 
socio-economic mobility and cultural integration. Combating this, the EC is focused on 
early childhood education through the desegregation of schools along economic and ethnic 
strata (European Commission, 2011a). The EU has a fund that invests in new early educa-
tion programs that strives to keep all states economically competitive.
         Cultural integration is a key component to prevent tensions between third nation 
migrants and ethnically native populations. The EU realizes that culture is a significant 
impediment to integration and several working papers and policies are focused on cultural 
integration. The EU works on intercultural communication through an EU wide “Year 
of Intercultural Communication” that focuses on reducing cultural tensions across the 
EU, especially targeting intercultural cities, with large multicultural populations (European 
Commission, 2005). The EU theorizes that cultural alienation leads to radicalization of 
youth and impedes migrant integration. 
Part VIII: Conclusion 
       The unique history and culture of the Maghreb region and its interactions with France 
have created the conditions in which immigrants live today. A result of political under-
representation, economic exclusion, lack of education, and religious tensions, disparities 
between immigrant populations and mainstream French society continues to grow. These 
disparities create cleavages in society that are potentially destabilizing in the long run and 
may contribute to radicalization of immigrant youth. Within France, Maghrebis in different 
urban areas face unique circumstances as seen in the cases of Paris and Marseille. In com-
parison to other policy regimes in Europe, with respect to Belgium, youth radicalization 
remains a significant problem for large integrating populations. As the European Union 
takes a retracted role in integration policies, future integration will have to exist at the local 
and national levels through European Union funding. As long as there is limited effort to 
integrate migrant priorities into the dominant ideology of the host country, integration will 
continue to remain a constant threat to preserving immigrant identity and social cohesion 
in France and other European Union nations.   
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